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The attitude of competition authorities and courts towards vertical restraints varies sig-
niﬁcantly from one country to another or from one period to another.1 Still, it emerges
a consensus against resale price maintenance (RPM), a restraint according to which the
manufacturer sets the ﬁnal price that retailers charge to consumers. While competition
authorities are sometimes tolerant towards some variants of RPM such as price ceilings
and recommended or advertised prices, they usually treat price ﬂoors and strict RPM
as per se illegal. For example, the European Commission recently adopted a more open
attitude towards nonprice restrictions but it maintained RPM on a black list — with only
one other restraint. In France, price ﬂoors are per se illegal and, in Lypobar vs. La Crois-
santerie (1989), the Paris Court of Appeal ruled that RPM was an abuse of franchisees’
economic dependence.
In contrast with the consensus of the jurisprudence against RPM, the economic anal-
ysis of vertical restraints is more ambiguous: it is not straightforward that RPM has a
more negative impact on welfare than other vertical restraints that limit as well intrabrand
competition; instead, both price (e.g., RPM) and non-price restraints (e.g., exclusive ter-
ritories) have positive and negative eﬀects on welfare, depending on the context in which
they are used.2 Moreover, a comparison of the welfare eﬀects of exclusive territories,
RPM and exclusive dealing shows that the balance is not clearly in favor of nonprice
restrictions.3
Minimum prices might of course be sponsored by retailers to maintain a downstream
cartel: that is, retailers may try to enforce an illegal horizontal agreement through vertical
arrangements that restrict prices.4 Less clear is the case of purely vertical contracts, where
manufacturers and retailers bilaterally negotiate their own wholesale and retail prices.
A few papers have stressed that RPM can help a manufacturer to better exert its
1For an overview of the legal frameworks regarding vertical restraints, see OECD (1994) or the Euro-
pean Commission’s Green Paper on Vertical Restraints (1996). Comanor-Rey (1996) also compares the
evolution of the attitudes of the U.S. competition authorities and within the European Community.
2In particular, the arguments that courts have put forward to justify territorial restraints could often
be used as well in favor of RPM.
3See Caballero-Sanz and Rey (1996).
4For example, in response to increased pressure from their national cartel oﬃce, Swiss bookstores
entered into an exclusive agreement with a unique importer to maintain high prices for German books.
2market power. Hart and Tirole (1990) show for example that a manufacturer is tempted
to free-ride on its retailers when vertical contracts are privately negotiated and not pub-
licly observed; as a result, downstream competition percolates to the upstream level and
prevents the manufacturer from fully exerting its market power.5 In this context, an
industry wide price-ﬂoor would prevent the risk of opportunistic behavior and help the
manufacturer to exert its market power. O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1992) further show that
bilaterally negotiated price ceilings, too, can help prevent opportunism.6
Those papers thus stress that RPM can help restore pre-existing market power. Dob-
son and Waterson (1997) study instead a bilateral duopoly with interlocking relationships.
Assuming that manufacturers use (ineﬃcient) linear wholesale prices, they show that the
welfare eﬀects of RPM depend on the relative degree of upstream and downstream dif-
ferentiation as well as on retailers’ and manufacturers’ bargaining powers; RPM can be
socially preferable when retailers are in a weak bargaining position, because the double-
marginalization problems generated by the restriction to linear wholesale prices is more
severe in such circumstances.
However, one argument often mentioned against RPM, and not yet much formally
analyzed, is that RPM can eliminate or reduce interbrand competition.7 A ﬁrst step in
that direction is provided by Jullien and Rey (2001), who stress that, by making retail
prices less responsive to local shocks on retail cost or demand, RPM yields more uniform
prices that facilitate tacit collusion — by making deviations easier to detect. In contrast, we
will focus here on a static bilateral duopoly with interlocking relationships, as in Dobson
and Waterson, but will allow for eﬃcient (two-part) wholesale tariﬀs, in order to eliminate
5The idea is that, when secretly contracting with one retailer, the manufacturer has an incentive to
free-ride on the others and ends-up selling more than the monopoly quantity. This insight is reminiscent
of the Coasian pricing problem for durable goods — or of a franchisor’s incentive to sell too many franchises
— and has further been explored by McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and O’Brien and Schaﬀer (1992). Rey
and Tirole (2003) provides an overview of this literature.
6O’Brien and Shaﬀer use a concept of “contract equilibrium” which concentrates on pairwise devi-
ations; therefore, they do not consider multilateral deviations which can indeed be proﬁtable, thereby
generating existence problems for standard Nash equilibria in contracts — see Rey and Verg´ e (2003).
7For example, in Continental T.V. vs. GTE Sylvania the US Supreme Court mentioned that a clear
distinction had to be made between price and nonprice restraints, since price restrictions seemed to limit
interbrand competition, thus facilitating cartellization —see 433 U.S. (1977) at 55.
3double marginalization problems and focus instead on the impact of RPM on interbrand
and intrabrand competition.8 Our analysis suggests that RPM can prevent any eﬀective
competition —at the interbrand level as well as at the intrabrand level— and yield instead
the monopoly outcome.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our framework, where two rival
manufacturers distribute their goods through two competing (but possibly diﬀerentiated)
retailers; this framework allows for interlocking relationships (“double common agency”):
each manufacturer can use both retailers, and conversely each retailer can carry both
brands. Section 3 provides a preliminary analysis of such double common agency situa-
tions: while retail prices are lower than the monopoly price in the absence of RPM, with
RPM there exist many equilibria, including one in which retail prices and manufactur-
ers’ proﬁts are at the monopoly level; in addition, introducing (arbitrarily small) retail
eﬀorts singles out the equilibrium with monopoly prices and proﬁts. We then endoge-
nize the market structure. Section 4 ﬁrst studies situations with potential downstream
competition, which is captured by assuming that manufacturers can bypass established
retailers and ﬁnd alternative retailers to distribute their products. Both manufacturers’
products are then always present at each retail location and, when RPM is allowed, there
always exists an equilibrium with double common agency and monopoly prices and prof-
its. Section 5 turns to the case of retail bottlenecks, where manufacturers cannot bypass
established retailers. Manufacturers must then leave a rent to retailers to induce them
to sell their products; relatedly, they may try to eliminate competitors by signing up the
retailers into exclusive relationships. As a result, there may exist no equilibrium where
both manufacturers are present in both retail outlets, even though there is demand for
each brand at each store. In addition, while there may as well still exist a continuum of
equilibria, equilibria with higher retail prices now involve larger rents for the retailers and
lower proﬁts for the manufacturer — implying that manufacturers favor equilibria with
rather “competitive” prices. Section 6 concludes.
8Another diﬀerence concerns the equilibrium concept. To reﬂect diﬀerent bargaining power, Dobson
and Waterson assume that wholesale prices are determined by simultaneous pairwise bargaining; this
supposes that a manufacturer has two independent divisions, each of them negotiating with one retailer
and not taking into account the impact of its own negotiation on the other division.
42 The Basic Framework
Two manufacturers, A and B, each produce their own brand of a good and market
them through two diﬀerentiated retailers, 1 and 2. [Retailers could for example diﬀer
in the services they provide to consumers, the location of their stores, etc.] If each
retailer carries both products, consumers can thus ﬁnd two competing brands at two
competing stores, and can thus choose among four imperfectly substitute “products”,
each manufacturer producing two of them ({A1,A2} and {B1,B2}, respectively) and
each retailer distributing two of them as well ({A1,B1} and {A2,B2}, respectively).
In order to avoid that one ﬁrm - manufacturer or retailer - plays a particular role,
we suppose that demand functions are symmetric (this implies that the diﬀerentiation
between the brands and between the stores is horizontal rather than vertical): for any
price vector p =( pA1,p B1,p A2,p B2), any i 6= h ∈ {A,B} and any j 6= k ∈ {1,2},
Dij (p) ≡ D(pij,p hj,p ik,p hk),
where the demand function D(.) is continuously diﬀerentiable. In what follows, we will
drop the arguments in Dij when there is no risk of confusion, and will systematically use
indexes i,h for the two manufacturers and j,k for the two retailers. The products being
(imperfect) substitutes, we will suppose that the demand for one product decreases with
the price of that product and increases with the other prices:9,10
∂1D<0a n d∂lD>0f o rl =2 ,3,4.





We will also assume that both production and distribution marginal costs are symmetric
and constant, and denote them respectively by c and γ.11
9We denote by ∂xf the partial derivative of f with respect to its ith argument.
10This assumption seems reasonable but is not always maintained. For example, Dobson and Waterson
(1997) consider a linear model where (considering inverse demand functions) the price of one product
decreases when the quantity of any product increases; in that case, the demand for one brand in one store
necessarily decreases when the price of the competing brand increases in the competing store (∂4D<0).
11We assume constant returns to scale only for expositional simplicity. The following analysis would






(pij − c − γ)Dij (p).
Throughout the paper, we assume that this monopoly proﬁti sc o n c a v ei np and maximal
for symmetric prices, pM =( pM,p M,p M,p M).
3 Preliminary Analysis: Intrinsic Double Common
Agency
We assume in this section that manufacturers have all the bargaining power and that
the market structure is necessarily that of a double common agency, by supposing that
the market “breaks down” whenever a retailer refuses to carry a brand. This second
assumption is admittedly ad-hoc and is only introduced to present the main intuition in a
simple way; it is relaxed in the following sections.12 Together, the two assumptions capture
in an easy way two essential features of (potential) competition for each retail outlet: (i)
retailers cannot get any rent; and (ii) manufacturers cannot exclude rival products from
either outlet location; as a result, as in this section, double common agency prevails and
furthermore manufacturers obtain all the proﬁts. The simplifying assumptions adopted
here allow us to focus on the determination of prices in this context. As we will see, the
analysis of price determination remains relevant when relaxing the assumptions, although
the distribution of rents and the existence of double common agency equilibrium situations
then become relevant issues when retailers have market power.
We thus consider in this section the following simpliﬁed game G:
1. Upstream competition:
(a) Each manufacturer i = A,B proposes a contract to each retailer j =1 ,2.
remain unchanged when ﬁxed costs are for example taken into consideration; more generally, it should
become clear to the reader that the thrust of the argument does not rely on a speciﬁc formulation of
upstream and downstream costs.
12This preliminary analysis is similar in spirit to the “intrinsic common agency” game that Bernheim
and Whinston (1985) use to present their main insight.
6Contract oﬀers are simultaneous and publicly observable,13 and consist of a
wholesale two-part tariﬀ (wij,F ij) and, if allowed, of a retail price (pij).14
(b) Retailers simultaneously accept or reject the oﬀers; each retailer can accept
both contracts, accept only one, or refuse both, and these acceptance decisions
are public.
2. Downstream competition: if all oﬀers have been accepted, retailers simultaneously
set their retail prices (as imposed by the manufacturer under RPM), demands are
satisﬁed and payments made according to the contracts. Otherwise, no product is
sold and all ﬁrms earn zero proﬁt.
The simplifying “market break-down” assumption ensures that manufacturers oﬀer
contracts that are acceptable by both retailers, and that retailers never obtain more than
their reservation utility, which we normalize to zero.
3.1 Two-Part Tariﬀs
Let us ﬁrst suppose that contracts can only consist of two-part tariﬀs. In the last stage,
if all oﬀers have been accepted each retailer j =1 ,2 sets its prices pAj and pBj so as to
maximize its proﬁt, given by:
X
i=A,B
(pij − wij − γ)Dij − Fij.
We will assume that there exists a unique retail price equilibrium for any vector of











the equilibrium retail prices, and by Dr
ij (w)=Dij (pr (w)) the resulting demand for each
product.
13The observability assumption is made for simplicity, to avoid technicalities such as a the deﬁnition
of reasonable conjectures in the event of unexpected oﬀers, and equilibrium existence problems —see Rey
and Verg´ e (2003).
14A manufacturer can choose not to oﬀer a contract, by “proposing” prohibitely high wholesale prices
or franchise fees.
7In the ﬁrst stage each manufacturer i chooses wholesale prices wi1 and wi2, and fran-
chise fees Fi1 and Fi2 so as to maximize its proﬁt subject to retailers’ participation con-





i1(w)+Fi1 +( wi2 − c)Dr
i2(w)+Fi2,
s.t. (pr
i1 (w) − wi1 − γ)Dr
i1 (w) − Fi1 +( pr
j1 (w) − wj1 − γ)Dr
j1 (w) − Fj1 ≥ 0
(pr
i2 (w) − wi2 − γ)Dr
i2 (w) − Fi2 +( pr
j2 (w) − wj2 − γ)Dr
j2 (w) − Fj2 ≥ 0

















hj (w) − whj − γ)D
r
hj (w).
In other words, through the franchise fees each manufacturer i internalizes the impact
of its pricing decisions on (i) the entire margins (pij − c − γ) on its own product (for
i =1 ,2) and (ii) the retail margins (phj − whj − γ) on the rival’s product; it therefore
ignores the rival’s upstream margins (whj − c). As a result, (symmetric) equilibrium prices
are somewhat competitive (i.e., below the monopoly level) whenever the retail response
to wholesale prices satisﬁes weak regularity conditions.
Assumption 1
i) For symmetric wholesale prices wi1 = wi2 = wi (with i = A,B), equilibrium retail
prices are symmetric, pr
i1 = pr
i2 ≡ e p(wi,w h) for i 6= h = A,B, thus leading to symmetric
quantities Dr
i1 = Dr
i2 ≡ e D(wi,w h); moreover:
ii) an increase in all wholesale prices increases retail prices: ∂1e p + ∂2e p>0;
iii) an increase in the wholesale prices of one manufacturer decreases the demand for
that manufacturer and increases the demand for its rival: ∂1 e D<0 < ∂2 e D.
These conditions are for example satisﬁed when retail prices are strategic complements
and direct eﬀects dominate indirect ones.15 In particular, they are satisﬁed in the linear
demand case analyzed in section 5.




∂2e p ≥ 0, where λR (respectively,
ˆ λR) denotes the impact on demand for the “product” ij of a uniform increase in retailer j’s (respectively,
retailer k’s) prices, implies ∂2 e D>0.
8Proposition 1 Without RPM, under Assumption 1 any symmetric equilibrium of the





Proof. See Appendix A.
If there were a monopoly at either level, (public) two-part tariﬀs would instead lead to
retail prices equal to monopoly prices. If for example a single manufacturer were selling
through competing retailers, it would set wholesale prices high enough to induce retail
prices at the monopoly level — and could then recover retail margins through franchise fees.
Likewise, if a single retailer were acting as a common agent for several manufacturers, as
in Berheim-Whinston (1985), manufacturers would sell at marginal cost, thereby inducing
the retailer to adopt monopoly prices, and could recover again proﬁts through franchise
fees.
Here, in contrast, the existence of competition at both the upstream and downstream
levels maintains retail prices below the monopoly level. This is because, as noted above,
manufacturers only take into account the retail margin on their rival’s products, and thus
fail to account that a reduction in their own prices hurt their rival’s upstream proﬁts. If for
example retailers are pure Bertrand competitors (that is, assuming away any downstream
diﬀerentiation), they are both active only if wholesale prices are symmetric (wij = wi),
in which case retail prices simply reﬂect wholesale ones (pij = wi) and franchise fees are
zero, so that manufacturer i’s proﬁt reduces to
Π
r
i (w) ≡ (wi − c − γ) ˆ Di (wA,w B),
where ˆ Di (pA,p B) represents the demand for product i = A,B when the price of product
A (respectively B)i spA (respectively pB). The situation is then formally the same as if
the two manufacturers were directly competing against each other.
3.2 Resale Price Maintenance
Suppose now that manufacturers can resort to RPM. Imposing retail prices is then always
a dominant strategy for the manufacturers: Whatever the strategy adopted by its rival,
9a manufacturer can always replicate with RPM the retail prices that would emerge and
the proﬁt si tw o u l de a r nw i t h o u tR P M .
Under RPM, the last stage of the game is straightforward. In the ﬁrst stage, given
the market break-down assumption, if manufacturer h i m p o s e sr e t a i lp r i c e s( ph1,p h2),
manufacturer i will choose wholesale prices wi1 and wi2, retail prices pi1 and pi2 and




(wi1 − c)Di1 (p)+Fi1 +( wi2 − c)Di2 (p)+Fi2
s.t.
(pi1 − wi1 − γ)Di1(p) − Fi1 +( ph1 − wh1 − γ)Dh1(p) − Fh1 ≥ 0,
(pi2 − wi2 − γ)Di2(p) − Fi2 +( ph2 − wh2 − γ)Dh2(p) − Fh2 ≥ 0,
or, since the participation constraints are clearly binding:
max
pi1,pi2
Π(p,w h1,w h2) ≡ (pi1 − c − γ)Di1(p)+( pi2 − c − γ)Di2(p)
+( ph1 − wh1 − γ)Dh1 (p)+( ph2 − wh2 − γ)Dh2 (p).
(2)
As before, each manufacturer fully internalizes (through the franchise fees that it can ex-
tract from the retailers) the entire margins on its product, but internalizes only the retail
margins on the rival’s product. But now, as the program (2) makes clear, since the man-
ufacturer controls retail prices, its wholesale prices have no longer any eﬀect on its proﬁt
(without RPM, these wholesale prices had an indirect eﬀect, as they aﬀected retailers’
prices); however, these wholesale prices aﬀect the rival’s proﬁt (which only account for the
retail margins on the manufacturer’s product) and thus the equilibrium behavior of the
competitor. As a result, there usually exists a continuum of equilibria — one equilibrium
for every proﬁle of wholesale prices w =( wA1,w B1,w A2,w B2).
If for example manufacturer h sells at cost (wh1 = wh2 = c), (2) becomes:
max
pi1,pi2
(pi1 − c − γ)Di1 (p)+( ph1 − c − γ)Dh1 (p)
+(pi2 − c − γ)Di2 (p)+( ph2 − c − γ)Dh2 (p).
Manufacturer i then fully internalizes the impact of its retail prices on aggregate proﬁts,
and thus sets its prices at the monopoly level if manufacturer h does so; there thus exists
an equilibrium in which both manufacturers set wholesale prices to c and retail prices to
the monopoly level, and share monopoly proﬁts. RPM can thus prevent the exercise of
10interbrand as well as intrabrand competition.16
If instead manufacturers adopt wholesale prices above cost, since they do not take
into account upstream margins on the rival brand they will tend to choose more aggres-
sive retail prices for their own brand. As a result, one would expect an inverse relation
between wholesale and retail prices. The next proposition conﬁrms this intuition under
the following regularity condition:
Assumption 2
i) For wh1 = wh2 = wh and ph1 = ph2 = ph,t h er e v e n u ef u n c t i o nΠ is single-peaked in
(pi1,p i2) and maximal for symmetric prices, ˆ pi1 =ˆ pi2 =ˆ p(ph,w h);
ii) ˆ p(.,.) satisﬁes 0 < ∂1ˆ p<1 and, for any w, the function p → ˆ p(p,w) has a unique
ﬁxed point.
This assumption ﬁrst states that retail price responses are well deﬁned and preserve
symmetry; in addition, for any symmetric proﬁle of wholesale prices, there exists a unique,
stable, “retail equilibrium” (looking at a reduced strategic game where manufacturers
would simply choose retail prices, taking wholesale prices as given). We have:
Proposition 2 If RPM is allowed then:
i) There exists a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which wholesale prices are




zero proﬁt and manufacturers share equally the monopoly proﬁt.
ii) Under Assumption 2, there exists a decreasing function p∗ (.) such that, for any w∗
there exists a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which wholesale prices are equal
to w∗, retailers earn zero proﬁt and retail prices are equal to p∗ (w∗).
Proof. See Appendix B.
There is thus a continuum of symmetric equilibria and within this set of equilibria,
retail prices are inversely related to wholesale prices. Retail prices are at the monopoly
level when wholesale prices are equal to cost — in this equilibrium, manufacturers thus
16The argument still applies when marginal costs are not constant, interpreting c as the marginal cost
for monopolistic production levels.
11“eliminate” any competition and achieve monopoly proﬁts — while upstream mark-ups
sustain lower retail prices.17
The monopolistic equilibrium relies on the manufacturers’ ability to prevent retail
prices from falling despite low wholesale prices. Thus, price ﬂoors would suﬃce to maintain
the monopoly outcome, while in contrast, maximum resale prices (price ceilings) would
not help the manufacturers to maintain higher prices — in particular, retailer h would then
lower its prices below the monopoly level if it expected retailer h set monopoly prices. This
analysis thus justiﬁes the more negative attitude often adopted by competition authorities
towards minimum RPM (or imposed prices), compared with maximum RPM
In essence, with RPM the situation is one where manufacturers deal with two, non-
competing, common agents. Consider for example the polar case where retailers are pure
Bertrand competitors (no downstream diﬀerentiation). With RPM the manufacturers
eliminate retail competition and de facto allocate half of the demand for their products to
each retailer; the monopolistic equilibrium then simply mimics the Bernheim and Whin-
ston (1985) common agency equilibrium (without RPM) within each half-market. The
above analysis generalizes this insight to the case where retailers are diﬀerentiated. Re-
sorting to RPM generates however a coordination problem that does not arise in the
context of a single common agent:18 there exists indeed here (inﬁnitely) many other equi-
libria, including very competitive ones. The next subsection addresses this coordination
issue.
• Remark: bilateral bargaining power.
While we have assumed here that manufacturers have all the bargaining power and can
m a k et a k e - i to rl e a v e - i to ﬀers to retailers, the analysis would remain similar if retailers had
17Conversely, negative upstream margins would sustain retail prices above the monopoly level. The
range of equilibrium prices depends on the domain of validity of Assumption 2. For example, for the
linear demand used in section 5, any retail price from c+γ up to the maximal price for which quantities
a r e0c a nb es u s t a i n e d .
18With a single common retailer, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in two-part (or non-linear)
tariﬀs, which yields the monopoly outcome; however, introducing RPM in that case would again generate
a multiplicity of equilibria, since as above each manufacturer would respond to its rival’s wholesale price
and be indiﬀerent as to its own wholesale price. Introducing RPM in that case is not helpful and even
possibly harmful for the manufacturers.
12some bargaining power. Suppose for example that retailers have all the bargaining power.
In the ﬁrst stage, given the prices (pAk,p Bk) adopted by retailer k, retailer h would then
propose wholesale prices (wAh,w Bh), retail prices (pAh,p Bh) and franchise fees (FAh,F Bh)
so as to maximize its proﬁt, given the manufacturers’ participation constraints:
max (pAh − wAh − γ)DAh (p) − FAh +( pBh − wBh − γ)DBh(p) − FBh
s.t.
(wAh − c)DAh (p)+FAh +( wAk − c)DAk (p)+FAk ≥ 0,
(wBh − c)DBh(p)+FBh +( wBk − c)DBk(p)+FBk ≥ 0,
or, since participation constraints are clearly binding:
max
(pAh,pBh)
Π(p,w Ak,w Bk)= ( pAh − c − γ)DAh (p)+( pBh − c − γ)
+(wAk − c)DAk (p)+( wBk − c)DBk(p)
With RPM, there would again exist an equilibrium in which prices are at the monopoly
level — although now the retailers rather than the manufacturers would get all the proﬁts.
To achieve this, however, instead of removing the upstream margin (w∗ = c) the retailers
would remove the downstream margin
¡
w∗ = pM¢
,s oa st oa l l o we a c ho ft h e mt oi n t e r -
nalize the whole margin on the manufacturers’ sales through the other retailer — franchise
fees would then be used to extract the manufacturers’ expected revenues.
3.3 Eﬀort and Equilibrium Selection
The multiplicity of equilibria stressed above comes from the fact that manufacturers have
more control variables than “needed.” Retail prices allow a manufacturer to monitor the
joint proﬁts earned together with the retailers, while both franchise fees and wholesale
prices can be used to recover retailers’ proﬁts. The multiplicity of equilibria then derives
from the fact that a manufacturer is indiﬀerent with respect to the level of its wholesale
prices, which however drive its rival’s decisions.
The multiplicity of equilibria generates various types of problems. First, it creates
a coordination problem, all the more severe that there are inﬁnitely many equilibria.19
While the monopolistic equilibrium always exists (even in the absence of Assumption 2)
and yields monopoly proﬁts, the manufacturers may end up being locked into a “bad”
19While the previous proposition shows that there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria, the same
logic allows as well to construct equilibria around asymmetric proﬁles of wholesale prices.
13equilibrium. Second, it is diﬃcult to draw policy implications, since some equilibria are
better and others worse than the equilibrium that would emerge in the absence of RPM.
To circumvent this issue, we now introduce a (non contractible) retail eﬀort which aﬀects
the demand and is chosen by the retailers at the same time as they set prices. The level
of this eﬀort will be aﬀected by wholesale prices, so that there are no longer more control
variables (retail price, franchise and marginal wholesale price) than targets (industry
proﬁts, proﬁt sharing and eﬀort level); as a consequence, the multiplicity disappears.
To ﬁx ideas, suppose that the demand for a given product depends on both the retail
prices and a retail eﬀort e, as follows:
Qij (p,e ij) ≡ Dij (p)+ηφ(eij),
where η > 0 is a scaling parameter and φ satisﬁes φ
0 > 0 > φ
00 and φ(0) = 0. The eﬀort
eij costs ηψ(eij) to the retailer, where ψ satisﬁes ψ
0,ψ
00 > 0a n dψ(0) = 0. The second
stage of game G is then modiﬁed as follows:
2. Downstream Competition: if all oﬀers have been accepted, retailers simultaneously
set their retail prices (as imposed by the manufacturer under RPM) and choose their
eﬀort levels (one for each product they sell); demands are satisﬁed and payments
made according to contracts. Otherwise, no product is sold and all ﬁrms earn zero
proﬁt.
Under RPM, in this last stage retailer j chooses its eﬀorts eij and ehj so as to maximize:
(pij − wij − γ)Qij (p,e ij) − Fij − ηψ(eij)+( phj − whj − γ)Qhj (p,e hj) − Fhj − ηψ(ehj).
This leads to an eﬀort level eij which depends on the retail price pij and on the wholesale
price wij,a n dw h i c hw ed e n o t eb yer
ij ≡ er
ij(pij,w ij).













is now concave in (p,e); we denote by pM (η) the adjusted (symmetric) monopoly price.
In contrast with the previous situation, manufacturers are no longer indiﬀerent as to
the choice of their wholesale prices, since they aﬀect retail eﬀorts. To provide adequate
14incentives, they must make retailers residual claimants for their eﬀorts, which requires
wholesale prices equal to marginal cost. As a result:
Proposition 3 When RPM is allowed, for any η > 0 in equilibrium manufacturers use









ij = pM (η)
¢
, and share the monopoly proﬁts.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The proposition establishes that, whatever the impact of the eﬀort (even inﬁnitesimal),
in equilibrium the wholesale prices are always equal to the marginal cost. Therefore, the
only equilibria that are robust to the introduction of retail eﬀorts lead to the monopoly
outcome (in particular, p∗ → pM when η → 0).20 This result reinforces the presumption
that RPM has a negative impact on welfare, by allowing ﬁrms to eliminate any competition
that might otherwise prevail.
4 “Competitive” Retailers
The above “market break-down” assumption imposes double common agency as the equi-
librium market structure and moreover implies that manufacturers extract all proﬁts. We
now relax this assumption in order to endogenize the market structure and the distri-
bution of proﬁts. While this assumption is clearly ad-hoc and, as such, unrealistic, it
captures the essential ingredients of (potential) retail competition. Indeed, if there is no
retail bottleneck, in the sense that manufacturers can ﬁnd equally eﬃcient alternative
channels for each relevant retail location, then as in the previous section the following two
features are likely to hold:
• retailers have no market power, so that manufacturers extract all proﬁts;
• manufacturers cannot exclude their rivals from any retail location.
The analysis of the precedent section is then likely to prevail: manufacturers are
deemed to “accommodate” each other and their best strategy is to maintain monopoly
20As in standard (single) common agency situations, there still exist several equilibria but they only
diﬀer on how the manufacturers share the monopoly proﬁt.
15prices and share the monopoly proﬁts, which they can indeed achieve by adopting common
retailers (rather than marketing their products themselves or through diﬀerent retailers)
and eliminating intrabrand competition between these common retailers through RPM.
To capture the absence of retail bottleneck in a simple way, we now interpret Dij
as the demand for brand i = A,B at retail location j =1 ,2. and assume that, for
each retail location, each manufacturer has access to at least one potential alternative,
equally eﬃcient retailer. Manufacturers can thus either distribute their products through
the established retailers (who can carry both brands) or bypass them and use instead
alternative exclusive retailers. We denote 1A, 1B, 2A and 2B the alternative retailers and
assume that they face the same retail cost γ as the established retailers. In order to stick
as much as possible to the above analysis, we assume that manufacturers ﬁrst try to deal
with established retailers and therefore adapt the competitive game G by modifying the
second stage only:
2. Downstream competition:
(a) Whenever a manufacturer has an oﬀer rejected by a retailer, it can oﬀer a
contract to its relevant alternative retailer. All such oﬀers to the alternative
retailers are made simultaneously and public. Acceptance decisions are also
simultaneous and public.
(b) Retailers having accepted an oﬀer simultaneously set their retail prices (as
possibly imposed by the manufacturer under RPM); demands are satisﬁed and
payments made according to the contracts.
The ﬁrst stage of the game allows the manufacturers to adopt a common retailer
at each location, while the second stage captures the absence of retail bottleneck. A
manufacturer whose oﬀer is rejected in stage 1 then markets its product through its
alternative retailer as long as there is a positive demand for its product. This, in eﬀect,
prevents manufacturers from trying to foreclose their rivals’ access to consumers; it also
ensures that retailers are willing to accept any oﬀer that gives them non-negative proﬁts.
More generally, alternative retailers need not be exclusive and might well deal with both
manufacturers; conversely, manufacturers could also make oﬀers to alternative retailers
16at stage one as well (see the discussion below). This would not aﬀect the essence of the
analysis but would however complicate its exposition, by increasing the number of cases
to be considered.
We now show that the results of propositions 1, 2 and 3 remain valid here for a rea-
sonably large range of situations. More precisely, in the absence of RPM, proposition 1
still applies to any equilibrium with double common agency, and thus ensures that prices
are somewhat competitive; prices are moreover likely to be even more competitive if man-
ufacturers do not adopt common retailers, since in that case manufacturers and retailers
no longer internalize the impact of their pricing decisions on their rivals’ downstream
margins.21
When RPM is allowed, the preliminary analysis outlines a candidate equilibrium where
manufacturers share the monopoly proﬁt: in this “monopolistic” candidate equilibrium,
manufacturers adopt the “established” retailers 1 and 2 as common agents, sell at cost
and impose monopolistic retail prices, and extract all proﬁts through franchise fees. By
construction, no deviation from this monopolistic equilibrium is proﬁtable for a manufac-
turer if retailers keep accepting the rival’s oﬀers.22 However, by deviating and opting for
a more aggressive behavior, a manufacturer can now discourage a retailer from carrying
the rival brand.23 In essence, such moves allow the deviating manufacturer to act as a
Stackelberg leader: imposing a price below the monopoly level forces the rival to deal
with the alternative retailers and therefore to set retail prices that “best respond” to
the deviating manufacturer’s prices. Such deviations will thus be unattractive when, as
one may expect, Stackelberg proﬁts — which involve some competition — are lower than
monopoly proﬁts.
21Due to coordination issues, there always exists an equilibrium where both manufacturers bypass
the “established” retailers and use the alternative “exclusive” retailers instead, even if doing so is less
proﬁtable than the double common agency outcome: indeed, in such an equilibrium, each manufacturer
is indiﬀerent between waiting and dealing with the alternative retailers or relying on the “established”
retailers, who would act as exclusive agents anyway.
22Since each manufacturer gets half the monopoly proﬁtw h e ni t so ﬀers are accepted by the two retailers,
and retailers will not accept oﬀers that yield negative proﬁts.
23Retailers will refuse the manufacturer’s oﬀer, which involves a franchise fee equal to the monopoly
proﬁt (per product), whenever they expect rival prices below the monopoly level.
17The following proposition conﬁrms this intuition. To introduce the relevant conditions,
however, we need to consider two hypothetical scenarios of Stackelberg competition: in the
ﬁrst scenario, the leader (respectively, the follower) produces at cost c+γ the “products”
A1a n dA2 (respectively, B1a n dB2); in the second scenario, the leader produces the
three products A1, A2a n dB1 while the follower produces B2. The ﬁrst scenario is thus
a mere extension of the standard Stackelberg price competition to a symmetric duopoly
in which each ﬁrm produces and sells two products, while the second scenario involves
asymmetric ﬁrms.
Assumption 3 In the two Stackelberg scenarios just described, per product, the leader’s
average proﬁt is lower than the monopoly proﬁt.
In the ﬁrst scenario, the requirement is satisﬁed whenever prices are strategic com-
plements: Gal-Or (1985) shows indeed that the leader’s proﬁt is then lower than the
follower’s proﬁt,24 and since the industry-wide proﬁt cannot exceed the monopoly level,
the leader’s proﬁti st h u sl e s st h a nh a l ft h em o n o p o l yp r o ﬁt. Amir and Grilo (1994) note
that the comparison between the leader’s and the follower’s proﬁts is more ambiguous
when they are in an asymmetric position, as in the second scenario; however, there is still
some competition between the two ﬁrms, and since the follower sells one product only,
it is likely to be even more agressive, so that the above requirement sounds again quite
reasonable. Assumption 3 is for example always satisﬁed in the linear case analyzed in
section 5 as well as when prices are strategic complements and there is strong intrabrand
or interbrand competition.25





24When prices are strategic complements, L is willing to increase its prices in order to encourage F to
(partially) follow-up and, as a result, in equilibrium L’s prices are higher than F’s ones; thus, F “best
responds” to L’s comparatively higher prices, while L d o e sn o te v e nb e s tr e s p o n dt oF’s lower prices.
25The second, asymmetric Stackelberg scenario boils down to a symmetric Stackelberg duopoly when
there is strong intrabrand and/or interbrand competition. Suppose for example that retailers are perfect
substitutes (no downstream diﬀerentiation); that is, there is a demand Di (pA,p B) for brand i = A,B
and perfect Bertrand between stores. Then, in the asymmetric Stackelberg scenario, L anticipates that F
will undercut its price for B (that is, pB2 ≤ pB1) and the analysis is the same as for a standard symmetric
Stackelberg duopoly between a leader producing A and a follower producing B.
18Assumption 4 is simply a regularity condition ensuring that there is a unique price
maximizing πij (p);26 this condition is clearly satisﬁed in the linear case analyzed in section
5.
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 3 and 4, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium
where manufacturers adopt common retailers (double common agency) and RPM, set




and achieve monopoly proﬁts (that is, retail proﬁts are zero).
Proof. See Appendix D.
The intuition underlying this result is straightforward. It is impossible for a manufac-
turer to exclude its competitor from any location, since the rival always ﬁnds it proﬁtable
to deal with its alternative retailer at that location in the second stage. But then, the best
way to “accommodate” the rival manufacturer is by adopting RPM and sharing retail-
ers. As noted in the previous section, RPM eliminates competition between the common
agents, and common agency “eliminates” competition between the manufacturers.
Two part tariﬀs have played an important role in the analysis; franchise fees provide
an additional instrument for proﬁt-sharing which, in the absence of RPM, avoids double-
marginalization problems; with RPM, franchise fees allow manufacturers to extract all
retail revenues and thus encourage them to maintain monopoly prices and proﬁts. How-
ever, franchise fees are not essential for the argument and other types of contracts would
generate a similar analysis. Consider for example royalties instead of franchise fees. In
the absence of RPM, they would eliminate double marginalization as well and, together
with RPM, asking each retailer to pay back to the manufacturer a percentage of its total
proﬁt (almost half of it, say) would still sustain an equilibrium with monopoly prices.
This proposition thus extends Bernheim and Whinston’s insights to the case of “double
common agency”. Our analyses share two essential “ingredients” that derive from some
form of potential competition in the downstream market: (i) retailers accept any oﬀer as
26The proﬁt maximizing price is necessarily below the monopoly level pM, since (will all derivatives of
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(∂2D + ∂3D + ∂4D) < 0.
19long as their expected proﬁt is non-negative; and (ii) manufacturers cannot exclude their
competitors. This derives here from the manufacturers’ ability to use alternative exclusive
retailers when an oﬀer has been rejected. Other situations sharing the same ingredients
(i)a n d( ii) would yield the same outcome.
• This would for example be the case if, instead of using alternative (equally eﬃcient)
retailers at each location, the manufacturers had the possibility to sell their products
directly to the consumers (at the same cost). Although it might not always be easy
and/or costless for the manufacturers to set-up their own retail network, it might
not always be an unrealistic assumptiom, especially in sectors where internet sales
can be a perfect substitute for in-store sales.
• The situation would be similar if there was a competitive supply of potential retailers
for each retail location. Indeed, a similar analysis would prevail if we introduced a
second round of oﬀers in which manufacturers whose oﬀer has been rejected in the
ﬁrst round could simply turn to another retailer. This is probably one of the most
realistic cases: a manufacturer whose oﬀers has being rejected by a retailers is then
unlikely not to deal with another retailer in order to be present in each location.
• Yet another possibility would be to extend Bernheim and Whinston’s framework to
the multiple retail outlets case, and allow manufacturers to make (withdrawable)
oﬀers to several retailers (at any location) at the same time.27
The admittedly ad-hoc but simplifying “market break-down” of the previous section
is thus not crucial and there exists a wide range of situations for which monopoly prices
(through the adoption of common retailers and RPM) constitute a likely outcome.
The equilibrium mutiplicity issue still arises in this context. It is however somewhat less
acute than before, since some of the above-described equilibria involve low industry proﬁts
and would therefore be destabilized by a manufacturer’s attempt to convince established
retailers to carry only its own brand — thereby placing this manufacturer in the position of
a (admittedly constrained) Stackelberg leader. In addition, the introduction of (arbitrarily
27In a previous version of this paper, we obtained indeed a similar result using a framework more
directly inspired by Bernheim and Whinston’s original analysis of common agency.
20small) retail eﬀorts would again single out the equilibrium where retailers are residual
claimants — and retail prices are at the monopoly level.
5 Retail Market Power
We now turn on to situations where manufacturers have no alternative to the established
retailers. The existence of retail bottlenecks raises two issues. First, a manufacturer can
now try to eliminate its rivals, by inducing retailers to carry exclusively its own brand.
While this might induce more competitive outcomes, we show that it may also prevent
the emergence of any equilibrium where both brands are proposed at both stores — despite
the fact that there is demand for each brand at each store. Second, retailers now have
some market power and manufacturers must therefore share the proﬁts with them. As
a result, while RPM may again allow manufacturers to maintain monopoly prices, they
may favor an equilibrium with lower retail prices in order to reduce retail rents — that is,
they may prefer more competitive prices, and have a bigger share of a smaller pie.
To ﬁx ideas, we suppose that only the two established retailers (1 and 2) can reach
consumers, as in the “intrinsic common agency” framework exposed in section 3, but
retailers are now free to refuse a contract. The second stage of the competitive game is
thus now as follows:
2. Downstream competition: The two retailers compete in prices (or charge the retail
price imposed by the manufacturer under RPM) for the brands they have accepted
to carry; demands are satisﬁed and payments made according to accepted contracts.
In a double common agency situation, manufacturers must now ensure that retailers
get at least as much as they could obtain by selling exclusively the rival brand; as we will
see, this implies that manufacturers must leave a rent to retailers — that is, they cannot
extract all the industry proﬁts, even if they can make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers.28
T h ee x i s t e n c eo ft h e s er e n t s—a n dt h ef a c tt h a tt h e ym u s tb ee v a l u a t e df o ra s y m -
metric structures too — somewhat complicates the analysis. We could provide a partial
characterization of double common agency equilibria for general demand structures but
28They may be able to reduce retailers’ rents by making both exclusive and non-exclusive oﬀers; we
rule out this possibility, however, in order to better assess the impact of retail market power.
21it is diﬃcult to assess the existence of these equilibria and thus to evaluate the impact of
RPM on prices and proﬁts. In order to shed some light, we therefore restrict attention in
this section to a linear model where costs are normalized to zero:
c = γ =0 ,
a n dd e m a n di sg i v e nb y : 29
Dij (p)=1− pij + αphj + βpik + αβphk,
with α,β ≥ 0. The parameter α measures the degree of interbrand substitutability; the
demands for brands A and B are independent when α = 0 and the brands become
closer substitutes as α increases. Similarly, β measures the degree of intrabrand substi-
tutability.30 To ensure that demand decreases when all prices increase (condition (1)), we
suppose:
α + β + αβ < 1.
5.1 Two-Part Tariﬀs
Starting with the case where RPM is not allowed, we ﬁrst show that retailers’ market
power ensure that they earn positive rents whenever they carry both brands.
Given a vector of wholesale prices w =( wij)i,j (with the convention wij = ∅ if retailer j

















. At the second stage, retailer 1, say, will accept to carry
both brands if, by doing so, it earns proﬁts that are not only non-negative, but also higher
than the proﬁt it could derive from selling only one brand. Therefore in any equilibrium
29The expression of the demand is valid as long as all four products are eﬀectively sold. When product
ij is not sold (e.g., when the above demand would be negative or when retailer j refuses to carry brand
i), the demand for the other products must be evaluated by replacing the price of that product with a
virtual price ¯ pij, computed by equating Dij to zero (i.e., ¯ pij =1+αphj + βpik + δphk).
30For simplicity, we moreover assume that the parameter that measures the eﬀect of an increase in one
price on the demand for the rival brand at the rival store is simply the product of the intrabrand and
interbrand parameters.










B1 − FB1 ≥ 0, (3)
00 ≥ (˜ pB1 − wB1) ˜ DB1 − FB1, (4)
00 ≥ (ˆ pA1 − wA1) ˆ DA1 − FA1, (5)
where ˜ pB1 = pr
B1 (∅,w B1,w A2,w B2)a n d ˜ DB1 = Dr
B1 (∅,w B1,w A2,w B2) (respectively ˆ pA1
and ˆ DA1) denote the prices and quantities that result from retail competition when 1
carries only brand B (respectively, brand A).
Since removing one brand from one store eliminates one of the “products” available,
it leads to higher per product proﬁts; retailer 1 can therefore guarantee itself a positive
proﬁt:
Lemma 1 Whenever a retailer carries both brands, this retailer earns positive proﬁts.
Proof. Suppose, say, that retailer 1 refuses to carry brand A and consider the impact
on the proﬁts achieved by 1 on B. First, removing product A1 increases the demand for
all other products. Keeping the prices for the other products ﬁxed, this gives each retailer
j an incentive to raise the price for product ij. The nature of the retail price equilibrium
in this linear model (strategic complementarity of prices, stability of the equilibrium)
then implies that, in the new equilibrium, all retail prices are higher. Finally, in the new
equilibrium, retailer 1 faces a higher demand for product B1 (both because of the report
from product A1 and from the increase in the price for the other products) and therefore
achieves a greater proﬁt on this product.
This implies (˜ pB1 − wB1) ˜ DB1 > (pr
B1 − wB1)Dr





A1 − FA1 > 0. (6)
T h es a m ea r g u m e n ts h o w st h a t( ˆ pA1 − wA1) ˆ DA1 > (pr
A1 − wA1)Dr





B1 − FB1 > 0. (7)
Combining (6) and (7) implies that retailer 1 gets positive rents and that (3) is not
binding.
23The next Proposition shows that, due to retailers’ market power, it may be the case
that no symmetric equilibrium exists where both retailers carry both brands.
Proposition 5 For α =0 .1 and β =0 .3, without RPM there exists no symmetric equi-
librium with double common agency.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Even though there is a positive demand for each brand at each store, there does not
always exist an equilibrium where both retailers sell both products. Because manufactur-
ers must now rely on the established retailers to distribute their products, manufacturers
have now increased incentives to eliminate competitors by signing up the retailers into
exclusive relationships. In addition, manufacturers must now leave a rent to the retailers,
to convince them to carry their products. However, they will seek to minimize this rent,
which means that, in equilibrium, each retailer is almost indiﬀerent between accepting
or refusing to carry each particular brand; this implies that it is indeed quite easy, for a
deviating manufacturer, to break this indiﬀe r e n c ea n ds i g nu po n eo rb o t hr e t a i l e r si n t o
an exclusive dealing arrangement. As a result, a manufacturer can actually deviate in
am a n yd i ﬀerent ways: it can try to eliminate the rival completely, by signing up both
retailers into exclusive relationships, but it can also deviate with only one exclusive dealer
(and continue to use the second retailer as a common agent). In addition, in contrast with
the standard single common agent case (i.e., two producers selling their products through
a single retailer), the rent that manufacturer i must leave to retailer k now depends on
the tariﬀ oﬀered to retailer h; this implies that, when deviating towards exclusive deals,
a manufacturer can aﬀect the rent it has to leave to each retailer. As a result of this
richness of possible deviations, there does not always exist a “double common agency”
equilibrium, in contrast to the single agent case, in which there always exists a common
agency equilibrium.
5.2 Resale Price Maintenance
When manufacturers impose retail prices, in any symmetric equilibrium where both re-
tailers carry both brands, the contract (w,p,F)m u s tm e e tt h ef o l l o w i n gt w oc o n s t r a i n t s
24(where D(pij,∅,p hj,p hk) denotes the demand for brand i at retailer j when this retailer
carries only that brand):
(p − w)D − F +( p − w)D − F ≥ 0( 8 )
00 ≥ (p − w)D(p,∅,p,p) − F (9)
Since removing a product increases the demand for the remaining ones, (9) is the
relevant constraint and retailers therefore earn a positive rent whenever the imposed
retail price is higher than the wholesale price. The next proposition shows that such
equilibria exist and describe some of their properties:
Proposition 6 There exist ranges of values for α and β such that, with RPM, there
exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria with double common agency, with contracts of















1 − α(1 − β)w∗
2(1 − α − β)
,
so that p∗ (.) decreases from p>p M for w∗ = w to p∗ = p <p M for w∗ = p;
• retailers’ proﬁts are equal to (p∗ − w∗)[D(p∗,∅,p ∗,p ∗) − D∗],i n c r e a s ei np∗ as long
as p∗ ≤ pM;
• manufacturers’ proﬁts are a decreasing function of p∗.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Note that proposition 6 only provides suﬃcient conditions for the existence of sym-
metric equilibria with double common agency. There may exist other equilibria, including
other symmetric double common agency equilibria. Figure 1 represents the range of values
for which the existence result of proposition 6 applies.
Despite the presence of retail rents, the equilibrium retail price is still inversely related
to the equilibrium wholesale price. Two eﬀects are now at work. First, as in the absence of
25p p p M≤ ≤
β
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Figure 1: Existence of a symmetric double common agency equilibria
retail rents, raising manufacturer h’s wholesale prices reduces manufacturer i’s incentives
to increase sales of h’s products, thereby inducing manufacturer i to lower its retail prices.
However, increasing manufacturer h’s wholesale prices also reduces each retailer’s rent,
which is given by:
(ph − wh)D(ph,∅,p h,p i) − Fh.
This second eﬀect tends to mitigate manufacturer i’s incentives to keep low prices in order
to reduce retail rents, but is dominated by the ﬁrst one in this linear model.
Because of this second eﬀect, however, the equilibrium retail price is below the monopoly




2(1 − α − β)
<p
M.
However, since ¯ p>p M, there exists wM ∈ [w,0] such that p∗ ¡
wM¢
= pM: manufacturers
can sustain monopoly prices, but to do so they must set wholesale prices below their
marginal cost of production.
Subsidizing wholesale prices increases retail rents, however. In equilibrium, this rent






























Given the inverse relationship between p∗ and w∗,t h em a r k - u p( p∗ − w∗) increases with
p∗ and this eﬀect dominates when p∗ is small (namely here, as long as p∗ remains below
the monopoly level), since then (p∗ − w∗)i ss m a l la n dD∗ is large.










Industry Proﬁt Rent to be left to the retailer
Hence, starting from p∗ = p, manufacturers face a trade-oﬀ between increasing indus-
try proﬁts (by raising retail prices to the monopoly level) and reducing retail rents (by
maintaining low retail prices). Proposition 6 shows that in this linear model, the rent
eﬀect dominates; therefore:
Corollary 1 Among the equilibria with double common agency described in proposition
6, the most proﬁtable one for the manufacturers is the equilibrium with the lowest retail
price (and thus the highest wholesale price).
In contrast, the most proﬁtable candidate equilibrium for the retailers entails a retail
price exceeding the monopoly level —and if only lower prices can actually be sustained in
equilibrium, retailers will prefer the equilibrium with the highest price.
31By deﬁnition, D(p∗,∅,p ∗,p ∗)=D(p∗, ˜ p,p∗,p ∗) , where ˜ p is such that D(˜ p,p∗,p ∗,p ∗)=0,t h a ti s ,
˜ p =1+( α + β + αβ)p∗. Hence:
D(p∗,∅,p ∗,p ∗)=1 − p∗ + α˜ p + βp∗ + αβp∗
=( 1 + α)D(p∗,p ∗,p ∗,p ∗).
276C o n c l u s i o n
This paper provides a basis for competition authorities’ tough attitude towards RPM. In
a context of interlocking relationships where competing retailers carry several competing
brands, and as long as retailers’ rents are eliminated and that manufacturers are prevented
from trying to exclude their rival, RPM allows ﬁrms to maintain monopoly prices and
thus defeat both upstream and downstream competition. This is the case even when
retail prices are set independently for each retailer, and vertical contracts are negotiated
bilaterally and independently from each other (purely “vertical” RPM).
The situation is however more complex when imperfect competition among retailers
generate rents downstream. First, equilibria where competing retailers carry competing
brands may no longer exist, even if demand conditions would make this outcome desirable;
RPM may still allow ﬁrms to generate prices closer to the monopoly level — as well as
lower than without RPM. Second, which price level will prevail depends on how ﬁrms
coordinate their equilibrium behavior; retailers favor high prices while manufacturers
prefer low prices in order to minimize retailers’ rents.
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30A Proof of Proposition 1
We ﬁrst show that equilibrium upstream margins are positive (we >c ). The conclusion
then follows from the fact that manufacturers fail to account for (and thus “free-ride” on)
their rivals’ upstream margins.
• we >c . At a symmetric equilibrium of the form (pij = pe,w ij = we), manufacturer
i must ﬁnd it optimal to choose wi1 = wi2 = we when its rival adopts wh1 = wh2 = we;
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The ﬁrst-order condition yields (with D evaluated at pe and the derivatives of e D and e p
evaluated at (we,we)):
(∂1e p + ∂2e p)D +( p
e − c − γ)∂1 e D +( p
e − w
e − γ)∂2 e D =0 , (10)
implying
(∂1e p + ∂2e p)D +
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e − c)∂1 e D. (11)
Note that
∂1 e D = λM∂1e p + ˆ λM∂2e p and ∂2 e D = λM∂2e p + ˆ λM∂1e p,
where λM ≡ ∂1D + ∂3D represents the marginal impact on the demand for “product”
ij of a uniform increase in the retail prices for manufacturer i, while ˆ λM ≡ ∂2D + ∂4D
represents instead the impact of the rival manufacturer’s retail prices. Therefore, (11)
can be rewritten as
(∂1e p + ∂2e p)[D + λ(p
e − w
e − γ)] = −(w
e − c)∂1 e D, (12)
where λ ≡ λM + ˆ λM represents the impact on demand of a uniform increase in all retail
prices and is thus negative. But a symmetric retail equilibrium is characterized by the
ﬁrst-order condition:
D = −λR (p
e − w
e − γ), (13)
31where λR ≡ ∂1D+∂2D represents the impact on the demand for “product” ij o fau n i f o r m
increase in retailer j’s prices. Combining (12) and (13) yields
(∂1e p + ∂2e p) ˆ λR (p
e − w − γ)=−(w
e − c)∂1 e D, (14)
where ˆ λR ≡ ∂3D + ∂4D = λ − λD represents the marginal impact on demand of a
simultaneous increase in the rival retailer’s prices and is thus positive. Note that λR < 0
(since λ < 0 < ˆ λR), and thus (13) implies pe ≥ we +γ. But then, since ∂1e p+∂2e p>0a n d
∂1 e D<0 from Assumption 1, (14) implies we >c .
• pe <p M. The ﬁrst-order condition (10) can also be rewritten as:
(∂1e p + ∂2e p)D +
³
∂1 e D + ∂2 e D
´
(p
e − c − γ)=( w
e − c)∂2 e D.
Given we >cand ∂1 e D + ∂2 e D = λ(∂1e p + ∂2e p), with ∂1e p + ∂2e p>0, this implies:
D + λ(p
e − c − γ) > 0,
w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a t ,s t a r t i n gf r o mp = pe, a uniform increase in all prices increases
the monopoly proﬁt. By assumption the monopoly proﬁt is single-peaked at pM and thus,
pe <p M.
B Proof of Proposition 2
If manufacturer h adopts wh1 = wh2 = w∗ and ph1 = ph2 = p∗, from Assumption 2, man-
ufacturer i ’s revenue function Π is single-peaked in (pi1,p i2) and maximal for symmetric
prices, ˆ pi1 =ˆ pi2 =ˆ p(p∗,w ∗); this price maximizes Π(p,p∗,p,p ∗,w ∗,w∗) and thus solves:
ˆ p(p
∗,w
∗)=a r gm a x
p f (p,p
∗,w












;t h u s
¡
w∗ = c,p∗ = pM¢
always constitutes an equilibrium. In
addition, for any wholesale price w∗ there exists a price p∗ satisfying p∗ =ˆ p(p∗,w∗); this
price is characterized by the ﬁrst-order equation:
D + λM (p
∗ − c − γ)+ˆ λM (p
∗ − w
∗ − γ)=0 , (16)
32with λM and ˆ λM as deﬁned in the previous section. To establish that p∗ decreases when
w∗ increases, note ﬁrst that ∂2
13f = −ˆ λM < 0 . Therefore, a standard revealed prefer-
ence argument leads to ∂2ˆ p<0. From Assumption 2, 0 < ∂1ˆ p<1t h eﬁxed point to
p → ˆ p(p,w∗) then decreases when w∗ increases.
C Proof of Proposition 3
At the last stage, retailer j chooses eij and ehj so as to maximize its proﬁt:
πD







− Fij − ηψ(eij)







− Fhj − ηψ(ehj).
This proﬁt function is concave in the eﬀort levels and the adopted eﬀort level er
ij ≡ er
ij(pij,w ij)








This reaction function er






0 (eij) < 0.
Given the franchise fees it can impose on retailers, manufacturer i seeks to maximize:
X
j=1,2





























The wholesale price wij aﬀe c t st h i sp r o ﬁt through only through its impact on er
ij; further-
more, this proﬁt is strictly concave in er









Given the retailers’ behavior characterized by (17), the manufacturer now cares about
the level of its wholesale price and optimally chooses: wij = c. Thus, in equilibrium
all wholesale prices are set to the marginal cost. Taking into account (17), this implies
that manufacturer’s variable proﬁt coincides with the monopoly proﬁt. Hence, under our
assumptions on e Π, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, which is such that w∗
ij = c
and p∗
ij = pM (η).
33D Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is constructive and based on the following candidate equilibrium path: both
manufacturers oﬀer the contract Cc =
¡
wc = c,pc = pM,Fc =
¡






the “established” retailers 1 and 2 and all four oﬀers are accepted at stage 1. Retailers
thus make zero proﬁts and manufacturers share the monopoly proﬁt.
No proﬁtable deviation for the retailers
Let us ﬁrst show that it is actually an equilibrium for the two retailers to accept both
oﬀers. It cannot be proﬁtable for a retailer to reject both oﬀers since it would then get
zero proﬁt. The only deviation to consider is thus one in which retailer j (j =1 ,2) rejects
the oﬀer made by manufacturer i (but accepts manufacturer h’s oﬀer; i 6= h ∈ {A,B}).
In this case, because wc = c,manufacturer i will always ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deal with
the alternative retailer ji, and, under Assumption 4 sets a retail price pij = p∗∗ below the
monopoly level:
p
∗∗ =a r gm a x
p












would therefore achieve a negative proﬁt.
No proﬁtable deviation for the manufacturers
If manufacturer i deviates from the equilibrium path at stage 1, this aﬀects the set of
contracts that are accepted by the retailers in this ﬁrst round. We therefore analyze the
possible eﬀect of a deviation by manufacturer i on its proﬁt depending on the market
structure at the end of stage 1 (that is, on the set of accepted contracts). To be proﬁtable
a deviation must be such that manufacturer i achieves a proﬁt strictly larger than πM
2 .
The deviations fall into three categories:
Manufacturer h’s oﬀers have both been accepted
We can easily rule out any such deviation. If this is the case, retailers j and k have accepted
to pay F c = πM
4 each to the manufacturer h. Moreover, the total proﬁt generated by the
34sales of all products cannot be larger than πM. Since a retailer would never accept an
oﬀer if it expects to make losses, the maximum proﬁt that manufacturer i will be able to
achieve is πM − 2F c = πM
2 .
Manufacturer h’s oﬀers have both been rejected
At stage 2, manufacturer h thus deals with the alternative retailers (1h and 2h) and thus
chooses the prices ph1 and ph2 that are its best replies to the prices pi1 and pi2 that have
either been accepted by the retailer(s) at stage 1 or that are set by manufacturer i (dealing
with retailers 1i and 2i)a ts t a g e2 . The prices ph1 and ph2 are therefore equal to the prices
that the follower of our ﬁrst Stackelberg scenario when the leader sets prices pi1 and pi2.32
Given that manufacturer i’s proﬁt can only come from the sales of products i1a n di2
(through either the “established” or the “alternative” retailers), the highest proﬁti tc a n
achieve is the proﬁt of the leader of this ﬁrst Stackelberg scenario which, by Assumption
3, is lower than πM
2 .
Only one of manufacturer h’s oﬀers has been accepted (say, by retailer j)
At stage 2, manufacturer h thus sells products hk through the “alternative” retailer kh.
Given that whj = c, it chooses the price phj that maximizes the proﬁtm a d eo nt h es a l e so f
this product. This price is thus the best response of the follower of our second Stackelberg
scenario when the leader sets prices pi1,p i2 and ph1 = pM .33
We now have two possibilities to consider depending on whether the deviation is such
that retailer j accepts manufacturer i’s oﬀer or not.
• Suppose ﬁrst that the deviation is such that the oﬀer ij is accepted. In this case,
through the franchise Fij, manufacturer i can expect to recover the retail proﬁt
made by retailer j on product hj minus the franchise FC = πM
4 that retailer j has
to pay to manufacturer h. Given that whj = c,the retail margin is in this case equal
to the total margin. Manufacturer i thus sets prices pi1 and pi2 (simultaneously or
32In this scenario, the leader (respectively, the follower) produces and sells at cost c+γ the “products”
A1a n dA2 (respectively, B1a n dB2).
33In this scenario, the leader produces and sells at cost c+γ the “products” A1, A2a n dB1, while the
follower produces and sells at cost c + γ the “products” B2.
35not) taking into account the total margin (wholesale plus retail) on products i1a n d
i2, but also on product hj. R e m e m b e rh o w e v e rt h a tm a n u f a c t u r e ri cannot set the
price of this last product (this price is necessarily phj = pM ) and that a share equal
to πM
4 of the proﬁtm a d eo np r o d u c thj has to be paid to manufacturer h. The
highest proﬁt that manufacturer i can achieve with a such deviation is therefore
lower than the leader’s proﬁt of the second Stackelberg scenario minus πM
4 . Under




• Suppose ﬁnally that the deviation is such that the oﬀer ij is rejected. For such a
situation to arise at the end of stage 1, the contracts must be such that retailer
j expects its retail proﬁt (on product hj) to cover the franchise to be paid to
manufacturer h. This means that the proﬁt generated by product hj has to be larger
than πM
4 . However if this is the case, manufacturer i would rather make an oﬀer to
retailer j (rather than distributing the product through the alterntive retailer ji)t o
recover all the proﬁt generated aboveπM
4 on product hj.
E Proof of Proposition 5
Set α =0 .1a n dβ =0 .3. First, if there exists a symmetric equilibrium with double com-
mon agency (with wij = w,Fij = F(w), then retail prices and quantities are respectively
given by (with w =( w,w,w,w)):
p
r(w)=0 .6802 + 0.6122w,
q
r(w)=D(p
r(w)) = 0.6122 − 0.3489w =0 .3489(1.7544 − w).
Therefore, necessarily, w ≤ 1.7544.
We only sketch the proof here; a more detailed proof is available upon request. First,
it is shown that the relevant participation constraint is indeed binding in equilibrium.
Second, it is shown that eliminating proﬁtable deviations rules out all values w ≤ 1.7544.
Determination of F(w)

















It thus suﬃces to show that the constraint is indeed binding in equilibrium.
Note ﬁrst, that if both manufacturers oﬀer (w,F) satisfying (18) to both retailers, it
is a continuation equilibrium for the two retailers to accept both oﬀers. This is actually
the only continuation equilibrium: clearly, whenever one retailer refuses to carry one or
both brands, the other retailer becomes more proﬁtable and is thus willing to carry both
brands rather than none; in addition, it can be checked that the other retailer still prefers
to carry both brands rather than only one.
Since double common agency is the only continuation equilibrium following any oﬀer
of the form (wij = w,Fij = F)w i t hF satisfying (18), it is now easy to show that there
exists a proﬁtable deviation for the manufacturers, if the condition (18) is not binding.
If this constraint is not binding, it suﬃces for manufacturer i, i = A,B,t oi n c r e a s et h e
franchise fees
Fi1 = Fi2 = F (w)+ε, with ε > 0a n ds u ﬃciently small.
This deviation does not modify the continuation equilibrium and strictly increases man-
ufacturer i’s proﬁt.
Under our hypothesis that α =0 .1a n dβ =0 .3, this condition writes as:
F(w)=0 .1179(1.7544 − w)
2
If there exists a symmetric, double common agency equilibrium of the form (w,F (w)),
manufacturers’ proﬁts are equal to:
πi (w)=2 ( wq
r(w)+F(w)) = 2
¡
0.3489w(1.7544 − w)+0 .1179(1.7544 − w)
2¢
=0 .4621(1.7544 − w)(0.8953 + w)
This proﬁt being necessarily positive, such an equilibrium may exist only if w ∈ [−0.8953,1.7544].
37Proﬁtable Deviations for the Manufacturers
To show that there exists no symmetric, double common agency equilibrium, we build,
for any value of w ∈ [−0.8953,1.7544], a proﬁtable deviation for one of the manufacturers.
Lemma 3 There exists no symmetric double common agency equilibrium for w<w=
0.2435.
Proof. To show this, we ﬁnd a proﬁtable symmetric deviation for manufacturer i
(it oﬀers the same contract (v,G) to both retailers), which does not modify the contin-
uation equilibrium (both retailers carry both brands). This deviation must thus satisfy
the following three constraints, ensuring that double common agency is a continuation
equilibrium:
(p
r (v,w,v,w) − v)D
r (v,w,v,w) − G +( p
r (w,v,w,v) − w)D
r (w,v,w,v) − F(w) ≥ ...


















ij (v,∅,v,w) − G (21)
We then assume, that manufacturer i sets a franchise fee G(v,w) saturating condition
(20), that is:
G(v,w)=( p
r (v,w,v,w) − v)D
r (v,w,v,w)+( p











Suppose ﬁnally that manufacturer i chooses the wholesale price v∗(w) that maximizes its
proﬁt, that is:
v
∗(w)=a r gm a x[ vD
r (v,w,v,w)+G(v,w)].
We then check that this strategy is proﬁtable for any w<w=0 .2435 (notice that
w is such that v∗(w)=w), and that double common agency is the unique continuation
equilibrium (since the deviation is symmetric, if it is optimal to accept both oﬀers when
38the competitor accepts both, it is a dominant strategy for each retailer to accept both
oﬀers). This shows that there exists no symmetric, double common agency equilibrium
for w<0.2435.
Lemma 4 There exists no symmetric double common agency equilibrium for w>w =
0.6423.
Proof. Let us again consider a symmetric deviation of the form (v,G). We now
look for proﬁtable deviation for manufacturer i such that manufacturer h is completely
excluded from the market (that is, such that both retailers accept manufacturer i’s oﬀer








ij (v,∅,v,∅) − G ≥ ...



























hj (w,v,∅,v) − F(w) (24)
Suppose now that manufacturer i chooses the wholesale price v∗(w) and the franchise
fee G∗ (w) such that constraints (23) and (24) are binding.
We then check that this deviation is proﬁtable for manufacturer i and that the unique
continuation equilibrium is such that both retailers accept manufacturer i’s oﬀer only for
w>w =0 .6423.
Lemma 5 There exists no symmetric double common agency equilibrium for w ∈ [w, b w],
where b w =0 .4973.
Proof. To show this, we consider an asymmetric deviation by manufacturer i such
that the continuation equilibrium is such that manufacturer h is partially excluded (let
39say only product hk is not active). We analyze the following deviation: wij =0 .4a n d
wik =0 , and the franchise fees (Fij and Fik) are such that:34
π1 [(ij,ik),(hj)] = max(π1 [(∅),(hj)],π1 [(ik),(hj)])
π2 [(ij,ik),(hj)] = max(π2 [(ij,ik),(∅)],π2 [(ij,ik),(hk)])
where all proﬁts are evaluated at wij =0 .4, wik =0a n dwhj = whk = w.
We then check that the unique continuation equilibrium is such that only product hk
is not active, and that this deviation increases manufacturer i0s proﬁts for any w between
0.2435 and 0.4973.
Lemma 6 There exists no symmetric, double common agency equilibrium for w ∈ [b w,w].
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of lemma 5, but we now consider wij =0 .6
and wik =0 .
This shows that, for α =0 .1a n dβ =0 .3 ,t h e r ee x i s t sn os y m m e t r i cd o u b l ec o m m o n
agency equilibrium.
F Proof of Proposition 6
We look for suﬃcient conditions on w∗ to ensure that C∗ =( w∗,p ∗,F∗), where
p
∗ =
1 − α(1 − β)w∗
2(1 − α − β)
and F




is the equilibrium wholesale contract of a symmetric double common agency equilibrium.
We only sketch the proof here; a more detailed proof is available upon request.
Note that we have constrained the retail price p∗ to be higher than the marginal
wholesale price w∗, therefore imposing w∗ ≤ wmax = 1
2−α−2β−αβ. Moreover, quantities
must be positive, thereby constraining w∗ to be such that:
q
∗ = D(p
∗) ≥ 0 ⇔ w
∗ ≥ w
min = − 1−α
α(1−α−β−αβ).
34We deﬁne in brackets the set of contracts that are accepted by the retailers. E.g., [ij,ik,hj]m e a n s
that retailer k has rejected manufacturer h’s oﬀer.
40The idea of this proof is now to analyze any possible deviation for manufacturer i, and
ﬁnd suﬃcient conditions to ensure that these deviations are never proﬁtable. Depending
on the contracts Ci1 and Ci2 oﬀered by manufacturer i, the equilibrium market structure
(that is, the set of contracts accepted by the retailers) diﬀers. We therefore analyze the
eﬀect of a deviation on manufacturer i0sp r o ﬁts depending on the type of the continuation
equilibrium. 16 diﬀerent structures are possible, but a symmetry argument reduces this
number to 10. Moreover, three of them can easily be removed: it is indeed never proﬁtable
for manufacturer i to induce a continuation equilibrium in which its contracts are both
rejected. Structures (∅), (h1) et (h1−h2) are therefore excluded. We then have 7 possible
structures to analyze.
Structure 0:Double common agency, i.e. all the oﬀers are ac-
cepted
In order to obtain a continuation equilibrium where both retailers carry both brands,
manufacturer i has to propose contracts Ci1 and Ci2 such that, for j 6= k ∈ {1,2}
(pij − wij)D(pi1,p
∗,p ik,p




∗,p ik) − F
∗ ≥ ...





∗,p ik) − F
∗ (26)
... ≥ (pij − wij)D(pij,∅,p ik,p
∗) − Fij (27)
If we only consider constraints (26)j=1 and (26)j=2, the maximal franchises i can set
are such that:






∗,p ik) − D(p
∗,∅,p
∗,p ik)),










∗,p ik) − D(p
∗,∅,p
∗,p ik))).
However, this proﬁt is maximized for pij = pik = p∗. Such a deviation can never be strictly
proﬁtable for manufacturer i.
41Structure 1:( ij − ik − hj), contract Chk is rejected.
In order to ensure that this structure can be a continuation equilibrium, contracts Cij
and Cik must satisfy the following constraints:
(pij − wij)D(pij,p
∗,p ik,∅) − Fij +( p
∗ − w
∗)D(p
∗,p ij,∅,p ik) − F
∗ ≥ ...




∗,∅,∅,p ik) − F
∗ (29)
... ≥ (pij − wij)D(pij,∅,p ik,∅) − Fij (30)
and
(pik − wik)D(pik,∅,p ij,p
∗) − Fik ≥ ...





∗,p ij) − F
∗ (32)
... ≥ (pik − wik)D(pik,p
∗,p ij,p




∗,p ij) − F
∗ (33)
Wholesale prices wij and wik can be set so that constraints (30) and (33) are satisﬁed.
If manufacturer i sets the maximal possible ﬁxed fees, its proﬁti s :
πS1(pij,p ik)=pijD(pij,p
∗,p ik,∅) − max[0,(p
∗ − w
∗)(D(p












∗,p ij,∅,p ik) − (1 − α)q
∗]
It is now suﬃcient to compare the maximal value of this proﬁtw i t hπ∗
P(w∗), that is,








We then check that there exist two critical values w1(α,β)a n dw1(α,β)s u c ht h a t
w
min <w 1(α,β) < w1(α,β) <w
max
and ∆1(w∗) ≤ 0f o rw∗ ∈ [w1(α,β),w1(α,β)]. This imply that such a deviation is never
proﬁtable for w∗ ∈ [w1(α,β),w1(α,β)].
42Structure 2:( ij − hk), only contracts Cij and Chk are accepted
A comparable analysis leads to consider the sign of the expression:
∆2(w












∗,∅) − (1 − α)q
∗]









Structure 3:( i1 − i2), only contracts Ci1 and Ci2 are accepted












(pijD(pij,∅,p ik,∅) − max[0,(p
∗ − w
∗)(D(p
∗,∅,∅,p ik) − (1 − α)q
∗)]).
We then check that there exist two critical values w3(α,β)a n dw3(α,β) such that
w
min <w 3(α,β) < w3(α,β) <w
max,
and ∆3(w∗) ≤ 0 for w∗ ∈ [w3(α,β),w3(α,β)]. This implies that such a deviation is never
proﬁtable for w∗ ∈ [w3(α,β),w3(α,β)].
Other Structures
Doing the same type of analysis for the other structures (that is, (ij), (ij − hj)a n d









M,w 1 (α,β),w 3 (α,β)
¤
and w(α,β)=m i n [ w1 (α,β),w 2 (α,β),w3 (α,β)] < 0.
We then verify that, for the values of the parameters α and β given by ﬁgure 1, we
have:
w(α,β)=w
M ≤ w(α,β) ⇔ p(α,β) ≤ p
M ≤ p(α,β),
and the contract C∗ =( w∗,p ∗,F∗) is the equilibrium contract of a symmetric double
common agency equilibrium.
44